In this paper we discuss the security of a distributed inner product (DIP) protocol [IEEE TIFS, 11(1), (2016), 59-73]. We show information leakage in this protocol that does not happen in an ideal execution of DIP functionality. In some scenarios, this information leakage enables one of the parties to completely learn the other partys input. We will give examples of such scenarios.
Preliminaries

Notations
In accordance with [1] , in the following, we denote by F q the finite field of order q, by F q n the space of all n-vector with elements in F q and by F q m×n the space of all m × n matrices with elements belonging to F q . We use overbar lowercase letters to represent vectors in F q n (e.g.ā represents a vector), and bold uppercase letters to represent matrices in F q m×n (e.g. A represents a matrix). We denote by x ∈ R D the process of uniformly random sampling of element x from domain D.
Distributed inner product functionality
The functionality considered in [1] , is the distributed version of two-party inner product (we refer to this functionality as DIP). In contrast to the conventional inner product, in DIP the result is shared between parties. More precisely, it is assumed that P 1 and P 2 hold private vectorsx 1 ∈ F q k andx 2 ∈ F q k , respectively, and intend to calculate w = x 1 ·x 2 such that for i = 1, 2 party P i receives an additive random share w i ∈ F q satisfying w 1 + w 2 = w.
In an ideal world, this functionality is handled by a TTP as illustrated in Fig.  1 . Since the TTP honestly follows the illustrated procedure, the output shares are uniformly distributed on F q and parties learn nothing about w = x 1 ·x 2 or the input of the other party.
Functionality F DIP
Inputs: P 1 and P 2 holdx 1 ∈ F q k andx 2 ∈ F q k respectively. Output: P 1 learns w 1 ∈ R F q and P 2 learns w 2 = x 1 ·x 2 − w 1 .
• otherwise, chooses u ∈ R F q , sets w 1 = u and w 2 = x 1 ·x 2 − u. TTP: Sends w 1 to P 1 and w 2 to P 2 . Remark 1. It is of vital importance to note the difference between DIP and conventional inner product. In the latter, since the parties learn the product, they always (even in the ideal world) can derive an equation for the other partys input using their own input and output. But, derivation of such an equation is not possible in the case of DIP ideal functionality.
DIP Protocol of [1]
In [1] , David et al. propose a protocol to realize F DIP . Fig. 2 illustrates this protocol (Protocol π DDG+ ). Protocol π DDG+ is designed in the preprocessing model and planned to be universally composable and unconditionally secure. In the preprocessing model, it is assumed that an initiator (denoted by Init. in Fig. 2 ) distributes a set of correlated randomness between parties before they decide (or fix) their inputs (preprocessing phase). After deciding the inputs, parties compute the functionality with the aid of preprocessed data (computation phase).
Security Analysis
A careful inspection of protocol π DDG+ reveals that it does not simulate the ideal F DIP completely. It is easy to check this for k = 1, where the input vectors reduce to scalar values. In this case, at the end of a run of protocol π DDG+ , P 2 learns P 1 s input. In [2] , authors ignore this case and reason that DIP functionality inherently is not private for k = 1. As intuitively mentioned earlier in Remark 1, it is the case for conventional inner product and not for DIP. In the following proposition, we formally state an almost trivial security property of F DIP which flatly contradicts the reasons given in [2] . 
Protocol π DDG+
Inputs: P 1 and P 2 holdx ∈ F q k andȳ ∈ F q k respectively . Result: P 1 learns w 1 ∈ R F q and P 2 learns w 2 = x ·ȳ − w 1 .
Preprocessing Phase
Init.: Choosesx 0 ,ȳ 0 ∈ R F q k and computes s 0 = x 0 ·ȳ 0 . Init.: Sendsx 0 to P 1 and (ȳ 0 , s 0 ) to P 2 .
Computation Phase
and sets w 1 = r. P 1 : Sends (x 1 , r 1 ) to P 2 and outputs w 1 . P 2 : checks whetherx 1 ∈ F q k and r 1 ∈ F q :
• ifx 1 / ∈ F q k , or r 1 / ∈ F q aborts and outputs w 2 = λ, • otherwise, outputs w 2 = x 1 ·ȳ 0 + r 1 − s 0 . Proof. P 1 and P 2 perform protocol π k ′ on inputsx = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ′ ) andȳ = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k ′ ) as follows:
1. They append a zero vector of length k − k ′ to their inputs and form extended inputs asx e = (x 1 , . . . , x k ′ , 0, . . . , 0) andȳ e = (y 1 , . . . , y k ′ , 0, . . . , 0). 2. Then, they run π on the extended inputsx e ,ȳ e , and receive w 1 , w 2 . 3. They output w 1 , w 2 . It is easy to check that correctness and security of protocol π k ′ reduces to correctness and security of protocol π. Now, it can be concluded that protocol π DDG+ does not realize F DIP for k = 1 and therefore it is not secure. Protocol π DDG+ is insecure for k > 1 as well. Particularly, P 2 can always deduce an equation on P 1 's input vector,x, after receivingx 1 =x +x 0 . That is,
Note that P 2 is not able to deduce such an equation in the ideal run of DIP functionality. Therefore, Protocol π DDG+ leaks some information about P 1 's input beyond what is available in the ideal world. Technically, the ideal world simulator fails to construct the view of a real world adversary that controls P 2 .
It is important to note that the simulation failure happens considering both semi-honest and malicious adversaries. Hence Protocol π DDG+ is insecure in both adversarial models. The information leakage explained above, may seem harmless for large vectors because the adversary learns virtually nothing about P 1 's input. But, regarding composition, this little information leakage will be a serious problem. We demonstrate it in an example scenario.
Example scenario: multiplication of a vector by a matrix
Suppose that P 1 has a 1 × k vectorx ∈ F q k and P 2 has a k × k matrix Y ∈ F q k×k and they intend to computew =x × Y in a shared manner. That is, they want to receive random sharesw 1 andw 2 , correspondingly, such that w =w 1 +w 2 . This computation will be trivial provided that P 1 and P 2 can run an arbitrary number of instances of a universally composable protocol for computing F DIP .
It is easy to check that protocol π DDG+ is completely insecure to be the underlying DIP protocol for this scenario. Assume that P 1 and P 2 run protocol π DDG+ to compute each element ofw. We denote the ith element ofw by w i and the ith column of Y by Y i . To compute w i , P 1 inputsx and P 2 inputs Y i in protocol π DDG+ . The output of each party is a share of w i . In addition to its output share, P 2 derives an equation onx from each run of protocol π DDG+ as discussed above. After k runs, the parties receive their desired outputs. But, in this state P 2 has k equations onx that will be enough to extractx if they are linearly independent. Specifically, if we denote byx as its ith element. Now, we can write the set of these equations in the form of x × Y 0 =q 0 which is a system of linear equations. Therefore, vectorx will be found uniquely if Y 0 is a non-singular matrix.
It is easy to extend above argument to matrix multiplication scenario and therefore all linear algebra protocols of [1] .
Conclusion
Inspection of the proof given in [1] and [2] for security of protocol π DDG+ reveals that, in the simulation process, the case of corrupted P 2 is not discussed in detail due to the apparent similarity to the case of corrupted P 1 . Considering the presented security flaw in this protocol, we can conclude a general recommendation to avoid any frugality in the process of security proofs, especially when tasks of parties are not exactly identical in the protocol.
In [1] and [2] , various higher level privacy preserving linear algebra protocols are proposed that the DIP protocol is their fundamental building block. Fortunately, these higher level protocols use the DIP protocol as a black-box and, thus, they can be implemented using any universally composable secure DIP protocol.
